Housing in Humanitarian Crises

Providing interim / transitional shelter post-disaster is a challenge, one where the demands for materials often outweigh the local supply. In unique circumstances, like the case of the tsunami that hit American Samoa in 2009, there wasn't enough building material on the island to address the shelter needs of the impacted communities. And while ordering more wasn't a problem, the multi-week lag from order to delivery due to American Samoa's unique geography, caused significant delays in getting people back into their homes. The point being that providing shelter following an event remains one of the greatest challenges to those in response and recovery, regardless of how straight-forward it may seem.

While the idiosyncrasies that affected the speed of recovery in American Samoa are unique to its geography, the challenges shelter represents post-disaster are not. Finding a shelter solution that's cheap, readily available, culturally appropriate, easy to put together, durable, can quickly be distributed, and can withstand the elements, are only a small set of obstacles that need to be overcome when figuring out how to get people out of camps and back to their communities.

The pressure to quickly implement a solution coupled with an organizational need to be "doing" while creating "impact," are part of the reason some shelter solutions fall short of their intended goals. A great example of this was witnessed when an International NGO implemented a shelter program in Haiti in 2010/2011. Shelters were distributed throughout the community but rarely used because they had no ventilation, the tarp walls provided no security, and they didn't come with doors. What seemed like a slam dunk on paper failed to gain any traction with the people it was intended to help.

Due to the host of requirements structures need to fulfill, hitting the mark can be exceedingly difficult when it comes to shelter following an event. That doesn't mean however that there isn't a shortage of innovative ideas that try to meet as many of the requirements as possible.

One such idea belongs to the I-BEAM architecture and design, with their pallet structure concept:

http://i-beamdesign.com/projects/refugee/refugee.html

While a great many challenges stand in the way of this concept making it to the front lines, it's one of
the ideas that I find interesting. For case studies on shelter designs following conflict and natural disaster check out: Sheltercasestudies.org, a great resource for examining a wealth of case history regarding shelter in dynamic environments.

While the magic shelter bullet remains an elusive ideal that many organizations covet, there isn't a shortfall of innovative ideas to spur the next round of implementation...if concept design intrigues you, I would suggest looking into Architecture for humanity and their book Design like you Give a Damn, where you will find no shortage of unique perspectives on post-disaster housing solutions.

http://designlikeyougiveadamn.architectureforhumanity.org/

Renters vs Owners

Disasters indiscriminately destroy whatever is in their path; its unbiased destruction puts many on equal footing regardless of socioeconomic status. While it's true that vulnerable populations tend to be disproportionately impacted by disasters, a flood doesn't care how much money you make, and where a tornado touches down has nothing to do with the strength of your investment portfolio. So if the damage caused by these community altering events doesn't discriminate, why do we when we respond?

Look pretty similar to me

Once the dust settles, the rush is on to cleanup and get back to the new normal; however, it's during response/recovery activities that something strange happens, organizations will choose to help one family over another. Of course every organization has the right to determine how they prioritize need based on their mission, but the result is that some families don't receive assistance as quickly because they rent and don't own their homes.

Now when I say "help," I refer to the cleaning and debris removal that needs to be done following an event. I understand that renter's have every opportunity to buy insurance for their belongings, but because they don't own the property, they are seen differently in the eyes of some response organizations.

This differentiation has to do with three factors:

1. Liability. Finding the property owner to get a release signed so volunteer groups can safely and legally work on the property.
2. The perception that Rental Properties are Income Properties and as such it is the responsibility of the landlord to take care of their tenant needs--not voluntary resources.
3. Slumlords / Absentee Landlords. There is a general reluctance to help those individuals continue to profit from their questionable business practices.

Liability
There that word is again...who knew trying to help people could be so litigious. In order for groups to use Volunteers, they need to ensure that everyone on site has signed a release of liability and that the homeowner has signed one as well. Oftentimes trying to find and schedule a time when the landlord can meet to sign the necessary paperwork is difficult if not impossible, which is why many renter's are passed over.

Income Properties
Rental properties are income generating properties, this is true, and a myopic view in my opinion. Just like there are butcher's and accountants, there are landlords, people who make a living off renting property. When someone who has several rental properties in a community and all of them are impacted, two things happen: 1) The livelihood of the landlord is put at risk and 2) There are fewer housing units in that community for displaced people to go. 

Slumlords
This is a difficult situation; based on my experiences I've noticed that undocumented families tend to live in units where absentee landlordism is usually the case...as a result, a lot of help that could be given is not because of fear on part of the family and a reluctance on the part of organizations to help a landlord who clearly has no interest in upkeep on their properties.

While renter's are not completely without options, with SBA providing low interest rate loans up to $40,000 to help repair or replace damaged personal items, it still doesn't address the hurdles renter's face in order to receive assistance following disasters.

If a community has surplus rental units available, the issue of re-location for many renters can be dealt with; however, what happens to renters and homeowners in a community like Minot, ND? Minot suffered a critical housing shortage before flooding impacted their community in 2011 displacing the majority of the town. A real consequence of a scenario like this can be that the fabric of a community can dissolve due to families moving to other states and areas where housing stock is available. In the case of Minot, FEMA built temporary housing units, but the lack of housing in rapidly growing communities is a real concern given the challenges renters face when trying to recover from disaster.

I feel that this is something that communities don't realize will be an issue until it's too late, but am unaware of it being a part of the larger community resilience conversation. Regardless of who holds the deed, those four walls and a roof provided more than just shelter for a family, they provided stability and a base to grow this 'whole of community' movement. And while I don't have a clear idea of the steps that need to be taken to bring clarity to this issue, I hope that the groups who work in homes regardless of ownership status continue to do so, as they are providing a great service to help communities fully recover.

Bigger isn't always better

As part of my history in responding to disasters I've had the good fortune to spend time in Haiti, albeit under difficult circumstances. One of those times followed the January 12, 2010 Earthquake...which is why reading the report issued by the GAO was and continues to be so infuriating.

The Governmental Accountability Office released an interim report on the efforts of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 3 years on...remember to take deep breaths. 

Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed Results and Face Sustainability Challenges 

The Highlights:

• Of the $651 million Congress allocated for Haiti reconstruction to the USAID, only $204 million has been spent three years later. And much of that has gone to questionable use.
• USAID is building a power plant, port, and industrial park all of which the GAO has concluded will not be able to be maintained upon their completion without continued outside support. Not only that but the projects were poorly mapped out and budgeted for and will likely require an additional $120-$190 Million to complete.
• USAID has reduced its permanent housing construction targets in Haiti. USAID initially underestimated the funding needed for its New Settlements housing program. As a result, the agency increased the amount allocated by 65 percent, from $59 million to $97 million, and decreased the projected number of houses to be built by over 80 percent, from 15,000 to 2,649. The estimated number of beneficiaries was reduced from 75,000 to 90,000 to its current estimates of approximately 13,200 to 15,900.

The Report makes the following recommendation:

The GAO recommends that Congress consider requiring regular reports from the State Department on USAID’s progress. It also recommended that USAID hire an engineer to oversee construction of the port and suggested the organization put community support programs in place for housing development projects.

Excuse me...I need to go scream.

Read more here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/06/25/194956/gao-slams-usaids-haiti-rebuilding.html#.UdFZLD4Y1rU#storylink=cpy

How is this possible? How was regular reporting and proper fiduciary oversight not part of the agreement in receiving $651 Million dollars?! I realize that implementing programs of this size and scope is not easy, especially in Haiti where nothing goes according to plan, corruption is commonplace, and the government wants things like flush toilets in new houses with no municipal septic system to process the waste produced. Be that as it may, the findings in the report do not paint a happy picture, and I hope for the sake of those still living in tent camps struggling with getting back to life as it was can expect better now that more eyes will be on recovery programming.

$1.4 Million dollar grant to Presbyterians for Volunteer Housing?!?!

Please read this press release found on Disaster News first to get background so that we start on the same page.

Now, please forgive the incredulity as I know what it takes to find housing for 50+ volunteers in disaster areas during immediate response, it's not easy, and even when it does work, there are always problems. But when learning about the grant from the Red Cross to Presbyterian Disaster Assistance (PDA) for $1.4 million dollars to "setup and coordinate volunteer housing" my jaw dropped.

Before I get into it, if anyone has any additional information on the details of this grant and would like to share them...please do, because it's in the details that I hope an explanation can be found. In going to the PDA site, you need to search to find any mention of it and in the world of disaster response this is a big deal...so what gives, where's the pomp and circumstance?

In the immediate aftermath of a disaster the need for housing is great, for displaced families, for first responders from outside the immediate area, for Federal officials, and also for Volunteers groups. Depending on the size/scope/type of disaster, the availability or lack thereof of housing can create a panic. This could be seen in the New York metro area following Sandy where housing was scarce and the need was great, and the influx of people overwhelmed what little was available. I spent several weeks knocking on doors before finding suitable space on Staten Island and on Long Beach on Long Island. All that to say, I understand what goes into setting up volunteer housing.

The reason why my jaw dropped is because setting up volunteer housing for 50+ people had a price tag closer to $1-2,000 mostly spent on infrastructure improvements: showers, shelving, secure storage, etc...and PDA now has $1.4 million?

To better understand how PDA does Volunteer housing, I found this document that outlines their Volunteer Village model. In the document you will see that the individuals responsible for running these villages are volunteers, so there is no cost for personnel to run the sites. In addition, there is a $20/person/night charge for staying on-site, presumably to cover utilities and upkeep. In addition to that, these villages don't take individuals...so it's not a holistic volunteer housing solution because it doesn't accommodate Individual Volunteers who need a place to sleep.

So what exactly is PDA going to do with $1.4 Million dollars? Even if they setup 100 volunteer housing sites in the mid-atlantic region, as far as I understand it, they are a cost neutral proposition. Even if PDA took between 5-10% and used it for admin/salaries...there's still well over $1 Million to spend on this and I just don't see how.

I would love to see what the plan is, how many sites will be setup, when, and for how long? How many Volunteers are to be housed under the terms of the grant? Where is this money going exactly? How do Long Term Recovery Groups feel about this in the Mid-Atlantic region? Is PDA a pro-bono subcontractor now?

A lot of questions come to mind and I'm short on answers. I realize I'm owed nothing, but a greater degree of transparency would be helpful especially as articles are beginning to pop up asking where, why, or why not Sandy Recovery funds have been spent...and this massive grant, a first of its kind if I'm not mistaken, is flying under the radar.